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SUPPLEMENT

EVALUATION OF SOURCE

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EVALUATION OF CONTENT

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- 25X1 1. The history of the Korean Volunteer Army (KVA) (義勇軍) now fighting with the Chinese Communists in Manchuria, began in 1933-34 when a Chinese named K'ANG (康) and KIM Wŏn-pŏng (金元鳳) together established the Korean Revolution Officers' Training School (朝鮮革命幹部訓練所). K'ANG was a graduate of the third graduating class of the Chinese Central Military Academy (中央軍官學校) in Szechuan Province; KIM was a graduate of the fourth class of the same academy. In the first term of the Korean Revolution Officers' Training School, forty Korean cadets were trained; in the second term, eighty were trained.
2. Immediately after the "July 7th Incident" in 1937, K'ANG and KIM established the Special Training Class for Koreans in the Chinese Central Military Academy at Lushan (102-59, 30-10), training eighty Korean cadets.
3. In 1939 K'ANG and KIM went to the Hankow area and organized the Korean Democratic Volunteer Army (KDVA) (朝鮮民主義勇軍) under the direct control of the Political Department of the Chinese Nationalist Army.
4. In 1939 a split occurred in the KDVA and thirty officers of Communist sympathies, including PAK Hyo-sam (朴孝三), left the KDVA and went to Loyang (112-26, 34-40), then crossed the Yellow River and joined the Chinese Communists to fight the Japanese.
5. One reason for this split within the KDVA was the friction between Chinese and Korean officers in the Special Training Class for Koreans in the Central Military Academy. The Koreans also felt that in the KDVA under the Political Department of the Chinese Nationalist Army, the Koreans were not being treated as equals of the Chinese. PAK's group, dissatisfied with such treatment, left the KDVA and joined the Chinese Communists.
6. The Korean Provisional Government, at that time headed by KIM Koo (金九), then dispatched KIM Tu-pŏng (金斗奉) to go to PAK Hyo-sam and attempt to

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win him and his clique back into the fold of the KDVA. KIM Tu-pong not only failed but he himself became one of the leaders in PAK's group and an ardent Communist.

7. PAK's group later became known as the Korean Independence Army (朝鮮獨立軍) and this army formed the nucleus for the present Korean Volunteer Army.
8. Korean Communists at Yenan were soon affiliated with the Korean Independence Army and all were under the command of the Chinese Communists when the Japanese surrendered. Korean Communists then agreed to move their troops into Manchuria to assist the Chinese Communists under the following conditions:
 - a. The Chinese Communists promised to supply the Korean Communists with arms, ammunition, food and clothing.
 - b. The Chinese Communists agreed to join the Korean Communists in a future Korean revolution.
 - c. Korean residents in Manchuria would have equal rights with the Chinese.
9. After the Chinese Communists agreed to the above conditions, the Chinese and Korean Communists acted together. In November 1945 the Chinese Communists started to transfer their troops to Manchuria. PAK Il-u (朴一宇) led approximately 600 Korean Volunteer Army troops to East Manchuria via Mukden. These troops had been recruited at Lutai (117-50, 39-20). As early as 1943 Korean Communists were recruiting troops from Peiping and Tientsin; the recruiting point was at a farm near Lutai from which the recruits were secretly sent to Chinese Communist armies throughout China.
10. In December PAK Hyo-sam led approximately 2,000 troops, recruited mostly in Chinchow (121-07, 41-07) and Mukden, to Hailung (125-49, 42-39), Iduho (125-46, 42-17) and Tunghua (125-57, 41-43). Their propaganda or political line was that they were not Communists nor Eighth Route Army troops but were the KVA, that they were in Manchuria to protect the interests of Koreans and that in the future they would be the Korean National Army. Their propaganda was fairly successful and many young people joined the KVA. However, in later months there were desertions and many were unwilling to join. The KVA authorities then changed their tactics. In 1946 they changed a part of the KVA in Mukden and perhaps other points into local Peace Preservation Units. This was at the time of the Soviet occupation of Manchuria. The KVA then recruited by force, giving the recruits two months training after which they were sent to the Chinese Communist armies.
11. It was the intention of the KVA at one time to enter Korea, but the joint USSR-USA trusteeship prevented them from entering as planned. Part of the troops of the KVA, however, did enter, disguised.
12. When the Chinese Nationalist troops entered Manchuria, the KVA moved to Linchiang (126-54, 41-42) and Jengchiang (126-48, 42-23). At this time they announced that they were an army which would "emancipate the proletariat of the world" and that the Chinese Communist Army was their partner.
13. Generally, the KVA is poorly equipped, but those units attached to the Chinese Communists are on an equal status with the Chinese Communist units. In addition to the Korean units, there are approximately ten to twenty Koreans in an average Chinese Communist company in Manchuria.
14. The supreme commander of the KVA is KIM Il-song (金日成) and the acting commander is CH'OE Mu-chong (崔武亭). Both men are in North Korea. CH'OE has the particular function of dispatching Korean troops to Manchuria from North Korea by way of Linchiang. The headquarters of the KVA is at Yenchi (129-31, 42-55). The various elements of the KVA in Manchuria are responsible through their individual commanding officers to KIM Il-song in North Korea. The actual arrangement and agreements between the Chinese Communists and KIM Il-song regarding the KVA are not known at present.

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15. Immediately prior to the Chinese Communist offensive in Manchuria which gained its impetus about 17 May 1947, Korean units in Manchuria, their principal commanders, their locations and approximate numbers were as follows:
- a. The force under the command of KANG Sin-t'ae (姜信泰), approximately 21,000 in number, composed of the 17th Column in the Fuphus area, the Independent 5th and 6th Divisions in the Chiachu (127-20, 43-43) area, and the 1st and 2nd Peace Reservation Brigades in the Yenchi area.
 - b. The force under the command of PAK Hyo-sam with headquarters at Liuho, approximately 26,000 in number, composed of the Yang Ch'ong-u (楊靖宇) Detachment and the 2 Independent Division both of Heihokou (125-41, 42-32), the Li Hong-kwang (李紅光) Detachment south of Hailung, the Chang-paek (長白) Column at Liuho, the Yong-san (龍山) Detachment at Hsinpin (125-01, 41-42) and the Sino-Korean Column near Changchun.
 - c. The force under the command of KIM Ch'aek (金策), approximately 34,000 in number, composed of the 3rd Column at Shulan (126-48, 44-21), the 5th Column at Chiamussu (130-21, 46-49) and the Liao-non (?Liaoning) Detachment at Shihho (121-52, 39-20).
16. The Yang Ch'ong Detachment is the only Korean unit that at one time contained a large number of Chinese—about 50%. This detachment now is mostly Korean. The other units are almost entirely composed of Koreans.

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